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11 Introduction
This work presents a new analysis of entry deterrence in vertical
diﬀerentiation models. We focus on the market coverage conﬁguration
issue. We emphasize why market coverage should be considered endogenous
for a correct analysis of entry deterrence in those models and discuss the
implications of this endogeneity. The approach that we present has been
overlooked in the literature as the problem of entry in vertical diﬀerentiation
contexts when there is endogenous market coverage has not received enough
attention. This approach would call for a revision of those analyses that
assume a given market coverage conﬁguration.
We consider that there are at most two ﬁrms in the market, an
established ﬁrm, or incumbent, and an entrant that faces an entry cost. The
consideration of only one potential entrant suﬃces to show the implications
of endogenous market coverage for a correct analysis of entry deterrence. To
allow for further entry of ﬁrms, maintaining endogenous market coverage,
would complicate the analysis without adding much to our contribution.1
We can assume, for instance, that there are reasons related to technological
accessibility that limit to two ﬁrms the maximum number of active ﬁrms that
may exist in the market.
Previous analyses with more than two ﬁrms or more than one potential
entrant assume market coverage exogenously given or impose a market
conﬁguration at equilibrium (see Hung and Schmitt (1988), Donnenfeld and
Weber (1992 and 1995), Constantatos and Perrakis (1997 and 1999) and
Scarpa (1998).2 As a consequence, those analyses do not consider endogenous
market coverage and do not allow for an analysis of entry deterrence like the
one developed in this work.
We model a three-stage game in our analysis: in the ﬁrst stage the
incumbent chooses production technology with its associated quality level; in
the second stage the entrant decides on entry after observing the quality of the
established ﬁrm and chooses quality in the case of entry; ﬁnally in the third
stage the ﬁrms that are active in the market select prices (simultaneously if
1Market coverage generally increases with the number of ﬁrms. But, markets are
often uncovered. Therefore, this market coverage conﬁguration should be present in most
analyses with more than two competing ﬁrms.
2Some of these papers (Hung and Schmitt (1988) and Constantatos and Perrakis (1997
and 1999)) center in the case of “natural duopoly”, where the market will be covered. See
Shaked and Sutton (1983) for an analysis of natural oligopolies.
2there is entry). Hence, we recognize that ﬁrms can change their prices in a
short period of time whereas a change in the technology takes a longer period
of time. In this setting it is clear that ﬁrms may reduce price competition
through quality diﬀerentiation.
Products of ﬁrms are functionally identical and are sold to a population
of consumers diﬀering in their “taste for quality” (or in their incomes). Each
consumer prefers a product of higher quality, but consumers diﬀer on the
intensity of their preference for quality. The analysis assumes away any
asymmetries of information about quality between ﬁrms and consumers. In
this framework we look for a subgame perfect equilibrium.3 We consider ﬁrst
a context where there are not quality costs and then the case with convex
ﬁxed quality costs.
Many analyses of vertical diﬀerentiation consider an uncovered market.
This conﬁguration is imposed assuming that some consumers are willing to
pay nothing, or almost nothing, for any good whatever quality it may have.4
This seems very unrealistic in most contexts. Although markets are often
not covered, we do not want to consider as potential consumers to these
consumers that are willing to pay nothing, or almost nothing, for any of
the goods that may be oﬀered in the market. Hence, we assume that all
consumers care about quality.
From our results, the observation that the market is not covered, or the
knowledge that the market will be uncovered not only when entry is deterred
but also when entry is accommodated, does not allow us to assume, in the
analysis of entry deterrence, that the market is always not covered. Even
i fw eo b s e r v et h a tm a r k e t sl i k et h eo n ew ea r ei n t e r e s t e di na r eu n c o v e r e d ,
i ti sn o tc o r r e c tt oa s s u m et h a tt h em a r k e tw es t u d yi sa l w a y sn o tc o v e r e d .
W ee m p h a s i z ei nt h i sw o r kt h a tw ec a nn e v e rd i s c a r dt h ec o v e r e dm a r k e t
conﬁguration in the analysis of entry deterrence. When the market happens
to be not covered, this market coverage conﬁguration is the ﬁnal result of a
process that implies the consideration of covered market structures.
Moreover, not all markets are uncovered. We observe also markets that
are covered or almost covered.5 In general, when entry is accommodated the
3Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979) and Shaked and Sutton (1982) settled the basis for
many later analyses of quality diﬀerentiation.
4A complete analysis of entry deterrence in an uncovered market may be found in Lutz
(1997).
5The markets of several white goods are an example. If we consider that the potential
market for a white good is formed by all individuals or families that live in an apartment
3market may end up covered or uncovered, depending on the heterogeneity
of consumers valuations of quality and on the quality cost function.6 In
some cases product diﬀerentiation will be small, price competition intense
and the market will end up covered. In other cases products will be highly
diﬀerentiated and ﬁrms will not cover the market as price competition is
reduced. To assume that the market is always covered may imply an
undesired restriction on the parameters and functions considered.
In this work we notice that when entry is accommodated and the market
is covered, the consumer with lowest willingness to pay for quality obtains
no surplus. The lower quality ﬁrm would ﬁnd proﬁtable to lower its quality
if it leaved positive surplus to this consumer. By doing so, besides any
cost savings, the low quality ﬁrm allows its rival to set a higher price which
eases price competition. This process would continue until the surplus of the
consumer with lowest willingness to pay for quality is eliminated.
Instead, we show that in the analysis of entry deterrence we have to
consider situations where the consumer with lowest willingness to pay for
quality obtains positive surplus. This occurs in the study of the situation
where the entrant would enter as the high quality ﬁrm. The selection
of quality by the incumbent to deter entry would cause small product
diﬀerentiation and intense price competition if the entrant would enter as the
high quality ﬁrm. The reasons are that the high quality entrant would not
diﬀerentiate much its product to save on quality costs or that the interval of
technologically feasible qualities above the quality selected by the incumbent
is small.7
All these market coverage conﬁg u r a t i o n sw e r ei n t r o d u c e di nS h a k e da n d
Sutton (1982). We will say that the market is covered with a corner solution
when the low quality ﬁrm quotes the price which is just suﬃcient to cover
the market. In this case the consumer with lowest willingness to pay for
quality obtains no surplus. We will say that the market is covered with a
interior solution when the market is covered and the consumer with lowest
or a house, there are many local markets for white goods in the more developed countries
that are close to full market coverage.
6However, it is often assumed in the literature that the market is covered or that it
is uncovered for exogenous reasons, or some restrictions are imposed on the models that
guarantee a speciﬁc market conﬁguration at equilibrium.
7This may also occur in other situations: for instance, if entry is accommodated when
the regulator establishes a minimum quality standard. A small interval of feasible qualities
above the minimum quality standard or a fast increase in quality costs above the standard
may cause that result.
4willingness to pay for quality obtains positive surplus. The third possible
market coverage conﬁguration is uncovered market.
To decide on entry deterrence the incumbent considers all feasible market
coverage conﬁgurations that might result from entry. He takes into account
how his decision on quality aﬀects the market conﬁguration that would result
from the best response of the entrant. To this end, he notices that the entrant
might enter as the high quality ﬁrm or as the low quality ﬁrm. From the
endogeneization of market coverage we obtain that the market conﬁguration
that would result if the entrant entered as the low quality ﬁrm and the market
conﬁguration that would result if entry is accommodated are diﬀerent to the
market conﬁguration that would result if the entrant entered as the high
quality ﬁrm.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets the model. Section 3
studies entry deterrence without quality costs, considering that technology
only allows for a maximum quality level equal to S. In Section 4 we extend
our analysis to situations where there are convex ﬁxed quality costs. The
last section summarizes brieﬂy the results. The proofs are included in the
Appendix.
2T h e m o d e l
In this work we consider situations where there are at most two ﬁrms in the
market, an established ﬁrm or incumbent (I) ,w h i c hi sa c t i v e ,a n da ne n t r a n t
(E) that may decide to operate also in that market. Only one product is
allowed for each ﬁrm. The entrant faces an entry cost equal to F but the entry
cost of the incumbent is sunk when the entry game starts. This asymmetry
on entry costs between the incumbent and the entrant does not aﬀect our
results, as, to study entry deterrence, we want an incumbent which is always
active in the market and, besides, the comparison between the proﬁts of
the incumbent when entry is deterred and when entry is accommodated is
unaﬀected by the size of any entry cost the incumbent might have.
Let us model a three-stage game as follows: in the ﬁrst stage the
incumbent chooses his quality level sI; in the second stage the entrant decides
on entry after observing sI and chooses a quality level sE in the case of entry;
ﬁnally in the third stage ﬁrms compete simultaneously in prices, pI and pE,
if ﬁrm E decides to enter, or ﬁrm I chooses pI,i fﬁrm E does not enter. We
5assume a framework of perfect and complete information.
Products, that are functionally identical, are sold to a population of
consumers diﬀering in their marginal valuation of quality. Consumers may
purchase either a single unit of the good from one of the ﬁr m so rn o n ea ta l l .
Consumers’ preferences are described as follows: a consumer, identiﬁed by j,
enjoys (indirect) utility U(j)=js− p when consuming a product of quality
s sold at a price p.8 His utility is zero if he refrains from buying.
The population of consumers is described by the parameter j which is
uniformly distributed between v and bv,w i t hv positive and b greater than
one. The assumption of v positive is necessary to allow for the possibility
of a covered market. If v =0 , as in Aoki and Prusa (1996), the market
would not be covered as the consumer with marginal valuation of quality
equal to v would not buy any good with positive price. We normalize the
number of consumers to one and assume v =1without loss of generality.
The parameter b measures the heterogeneity in consumer tastes for quality.
We also assume b>2, as we will show that whenever 1 <b≤ 2 the market
is preempted by the high quality ﬁrm.
We consider in section 3 a situation where there are not quality costs.
The analysis of entry deterrence with convex ﬁxed quality costs is developed
in section 4. When there are not quality costs we suppose that technology
only allows for a maximum quality level equal to S.9 Moreover, we assume,
without loss of generality, that variable production costs are zero.
When entry occurs and there are two ﬁrms in the market, let us use
subindexes h and l for the high and low quality ﬁrm, respectively, and denote
the corresponding demand functions by Dh(p) and Dl(p).C o n s u m e rj will be
willing to buy the product of ﬁrm i,w i t hi =1 ,2,o n l yi f
pi
si <j .M o r e o v e r ,
the consumer indiﬀerent between the product of ﬁrm 1 and the product of
ﬁrm 2 has j such that jsl−pl = jsh−ph, i.e., j =
ph−pl
sh−sl We know that, when
8This structure of preferences is very usual in the literature, following Mussa and Rosen
(1978). See Peitz (1995) for the construction of a direct utility function that has as its
counterpart an indirect utility function as the one used in this paper. Peitz (1995) shows
that the underlying preference relation satisﬁes reﬂexivity, transitivity, completeness and
local nonsatiation. Additive separability is a reasonable assumption as long as the price
of the product is such that the consumer expends only a small fraction of his total budget
in the product.
9This is equivalent to considering that quality costs are zero up to S and inﬁnite above
S. We could also consider that technology implies a minimum quality level and that this
minimum is below the quality levels relevant for the analyses in this work.


















































and the market will not be covered if
pI
sI > 1.
Through all the work we study equilibria in pure strategies. We will
proceed by backward induction to look for a subgame perfect equilibrium. To
solve the entry game it is important to know when each market conﬁguration
would occur in that game.
3 Entry deterrence without quality costs











with pI ≥ sI.I f pI = sI the market would be covered and the monopolist
proﬁts would be given by πI = pI = sI.I nt h i sc a s et h em o n o p o l i s tw o u l d
decide pI = sI = S and his proﬁts would become πI = S.






















> 0 ⇒ sI = S
In the case of uncovered market the monopolist proﬁts would be πI = b2S
4(b−1).
The monopolist will not cover the market as for any b such that b>2
his proﬁt sa r eg r e a t e ri fh ed o e sn o tc o v e rt h em a r k e tt h a ni fh ec o v e r st h e
market.
When the incumbent tries to deter entry he decides sI = kS,w i t hk<1.
The incumbent limits his quality, with respect to the monopolist decision, as
an entry-deterring device. In this case, the entrant may consider to enter in
the market with a quality level smaller than sI or with a quality level greater
than sI, and we will show that the resultant market coverage conﬁguration if
the entrant entered as the low quality ﬁrm is diﬀerent to the market coverage
conﬁguration that results if the entrant entered as the high quality ﬁrm.
If the incumbent decides sI = kS, and deters entry with this selection
of quality, he will set pI = b
2kS (by the same reasoning used in the case of
monopoly). As the proﬁts of ﬁrm I, when it is the only ﬁrm in the market,
increase with the quality level selected, the incumbent will choose, in the case
of entry deterrence, the maximum value of k (hence, the maximum value of
sI) that deters entry. The maximum value of k allowing entry deterrence
will depend on the entry cost F,o nS and on the heterogeneity of consumers
tastes b.
We can prove:
Theorem 1: Entry is deterred in the following situations:
i) 2 <b≤ 5 and









3(b − 1)(b +1 )
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8iii) 8.6581 ≤ b and
16b2(2b − 1)2







Proof: See the Appendix.
The lower limit of the interval of values of F where entry is deterred
increases with b and is continuous in b (in particular, when b =5and when
b =8 .6581). In the analysis of entry deterrence in the proof of Theorem
1 we obtain that the resultant market conﬁguration if the entrant would
have entered as the low quality ﬁrm is diﬀerent to the resultant market
conﬁguration if the entrant would have entered as the high quality ﬁrm.
Moreover, we show that when entry deterrence is feasible the incumbent
always prefers to deter entry than to accommodate entry (hence, entry will
occur only when it is not blockaded and, moreover, entry cannot be deterred).
Finally, in the proof of Theorem 1 we also obtain the following equilibrium
for the case of deterred entry:
Proposition 1: When entry is deterred the incumbent decides quality
sI = kS and price pI = b
2kS, with k such that:
i) k =
48(b−1)F





b−1)S when 8.6581 ≥ b ≥ 5
iii) k =
3(b−1)(b+1)F
(b−2)2S when 5 ≥ b>2
This value of k is continuous in b (in particular, when b =8 .6581 and
b =5 ) and decreases with b. As the heterogeneity of consumers tastes
increases, entry becomes more proﬁtable and the incumbent must deviate




when entry is deterred, the market will not be covered in this equilibrium.
T h es t r a t e g yo ft h ep r o o fo fT h e o r e m1i sa sf o l l o w s :W es h o wt h a ti na l l
cases the revenue of the entrant when he enters as the high quality ﬁrm (Rh
E)
decreases with k w h i l et h er e v e n u eo ft h ee n t r a n tw h e nh ee n t e r sa st h el o w
quality ﬁrm (Rl
E)i n c r e a s e sw i t hk. Figure 1 represents the situation:
Figure 1 is depicted with b ﬁxed and it is valid for any value of b.W e
represent Rh
E linear to simplify the presentation, but the functional form of
Rh


















these functional forms are not linear in k. However, Rh
E is continuous. We
measure in the vertical axis Rh
E, Rl
E and F and in the horizontal axis we
measure k.W h e nF ≥ FB entry will be blockaded (FB is the lower limit of
the corresponding interval of values of F where entry is blockaded). When
entry is blockaded the incumbent chooses sI = S (that is, k =1 )a n dRh
E(1)
and Rl
E(1) are lower than F.
If F<F B entry cannot be blockaded. In this situation entry may be
deterred if there exists a k such that Rh
E(k) <Fand Rl
E(k) <F.I nF i g u r e
1 entry may be deterred if F is such that FD ≤ F<F B. Suppose that
F = F0.F o r F0 entry may be deterred with any k such that k ∈ [k1,k 2].
Among the values of k in this interval we show that, to deter entry, the
incumbent prefers k = k2, as the proﬁts of the incumbent when he deters
entry increase with sI (i.e., with k).11 Hence, when FD ≤ F<F B the
incumbent will select k such that Rl
E(k)=F (⇔ k =( Rl
E)−1(F))t od e t e r
entry. In Figure 1, FB, FD, k1 and (Rl
E)−1(F) depend on b.
The determination of FD and (Rl
E)−1(F) requires to study, for each k,
the market coverage conﬁguration that would result if the entrant entered
11Notice that the incumbent will never select k<k 1 to deter entry. From Figure 1 it is
clear that if entry may be deterred with a k lower than k1 there exist values of k greater
than k1 that also deter entry.
10as the low quality ﬁrm and the market coverage conﬁguration that would
result if the entrant entered as the high quality ﬁrm. We show in the proof
of Theorem 1 that when the incumbent deters entry he selects a value of k
such that the market would have been covered with an interior solution if the
entrant would have entered as the high quality ﬁrm. However, if the entrant
would have entered as the low quality ﬁrm the resultant market coverage
conﬁguration would have been uncovered market or market covered with
corner solution, depending on the value of b.
4 Entry deterrence with ﬁxed quality costs
If there are quality costs, i.e., costs that increase with the quality level
selected, it is also necessary to endogeneize market coverage in the analysis
of entry deterrence. Quality costs may be either ﬁxed, when they do not
depend on the production level, or variable, when they do depend on the
production level. In the literature there are analyses that consider, in
contexts where market coverage is given exogenously, ﬁxed quality costs,
as in Aoki and Prusa (1996), Lutz (1997) and Constantatos and Perrakis
(1999), and variable quality costs, as in Crampes and Hollander (1995).
We consider that ﬁr m sf a c eo n l yﬁxed quality costs. These costs may be
considered as the ones required to incorporate (once for all) the technology
associated to the corresponding quality level. For instance, the ﬁxed costs of
quality may be incurred during the research and development phase of the
product. The case of variable quality costs is not considered in this work.
Variable quality costs aﬀect the equilibrium of the price subgame, contrary
t ot h ec a s eo fﬁxed quality costs, and, therefore, call for a complete new
derivation of the results. Moreover, as we need ﬁxed quality costs to have
ﬁrms committed to a certain quality level during price competition, variable
quality costs, if considered, would have to go with ﬁxed quality costs in the
analysis.
It is usually assumed that the ﬁxed quality cost function is convex and
we incorporate this assumption in our analysis.12 Let us represent the ﬁxed
quality cost function by c(s),w i t hc0(s) > 0 and c00(s) > 0. The reaction
functions corresponding to the quality decisions of ﬁrms are presented in
the Appendix. With convex ﬁxed quality costs, however, it is not possible
12The functional form of the convex ﬁxed quality cost function, together with the rest
of parameters, must make possible the existence of an equilibrium with two ﬁrms.
11to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium of the entry game in an explicit
way when there is endogenous market coverage. Hence, we discuss entry
deterrence inthis case using an example. In this example we also obtain that
when the incumbent deters entry he selects a value of k such that the market
would have been covered with an interior solution if the entrant would have
entered as the high quality ﬁrm. However, the resultant market conﬁguration
i ft h ee n t r a n tw o u l dh a v ee n t e r e da st h el o wq u a l i t yﬁrm would again depend
on b. In this example it is considered that either there is not a maximum
quality level or S is never attained in the equilibria considered. We use
numerical methods (Scientiﬁc WorkPlace) in the calculus.
Example
Consider that c(s)=s2















Proceeding as in section 3 we obtain pI = b
2sI and sI = 7b2
8(b−1). Therefore, if
entry is not blockaded and entry deterrence is feasible, the quality k 7b2
8(b−1),
with 0 <k<1, selected by the entrant to deter entry for a given value of
b will be the highest quality among those that deter entry for that level of
heterogeneity in consumer tastes.
When b =7we obtain k1 =0 .6938, following the same procedure than
in the proof of Theorem 1 (see also Figure 1). If entry may be deterred,
the incumbent will select k ≥ 0.6938 to deter entry. It may be shown that
when k ≥ 0.6938 the market would have been covered with interior solution
if the entrant would have entered with high quality, as the conﬁgurations of
market not covered and market covered with corner solution are not feasible
for those values of k if entry occurred in this way (the entrant would obtain
negative proﬁts in this latter conﬁgurations). However, in the conﬁguration
of market covered with interior solution the proﬁts of the high quality entrant
would be positive only if k<0.71852 (i.e., k 7b2
8(b−1) < 5.134). If k ≥ 0.71852
entry with high quality would imply losses and, therefore, the entrant would
only consider entry with low quality.
It is also obtained that if the entrant would have entered with low
quality, when the incumbent can deter entry, the market would have been
not covered.13 Finally, this latter conﬁguration would have also resulted with
13Market not covered is the only feasible conﬁguration for this case when k ≥ 0.6938.
12accommodated entry.14 Hence, it would not be correct either to assume a
given market coverage conﬁguration when analysing entry deterrence in this
case.
As in the case without quality costs, it is also true that, when entry
deterrence is feasible for b =7 , the incumbent always prefers to deter entry
than to accommodate entry. In this example, if entry is accommodated the
market will not be covered and the proﬁts of the incumbent are 5.7046.15









and we obtain that πdet
I is greater than 5.7046 for any value of k greater than
0.6938. ¥
5C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have analyzed entry deterrence in a model of vertical
diﬀerentiation where ﬁrms select quality and price, considering that covered
or uncovered market are endogenous outcomes of the entry game. As in
Shaked and Sutton (1982) there are three diﬀerent market conﬁgurations
that may result in the competitive game between an established ﬁrm and an
entrant: uncovered market, market covered with corner solution and market
c o v e r e dw i t hi n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n .
We have emphasized in this work the relevance of the endogeneity
of market coverage for a correct analysis of entry deterrence in vertical
diﬀerentiation models. We have proved that the market conﬁguration that
would result if entry were accommodated and if the entrant would have
entered as the low quality ﬁrm when the incumbent deters entry are diﬀerent
to the market conﬁguration that would have been obtained if the entrant
would have entered as the high quality ﬁrm when entry is deterred. Hence,
the incumbent must consider all feasible market conﬁgurations that may
result from entry to decide on entry deterrence.
14At the equilibrium with entry (i.e, with F small enough), there may exist a market
not covered if b>4.698 and a market covered with corner solution if 2 <b<4.73.T h e s e
parameter regions are obtained as in the proof of Theorem 1.
15The qualities selected by the incumbent and the entrant in this case are, respectively,
7.2403 and 1.3789.
16The quality selected by a monopolist would be 7.1458 when b =7 .
13Consider, for instance, that the market would not be covered if entry
was accommodated. This may occur as access to technology or entry costs
limit the number of active ﬁrms in the market and consumers are suﬃciently
heterogeneous. In this case, to decide on entry deterrence the incumbent
must take into account all feasible market conﬁgurations, and not only
uncovered market. The reason is that the entrant may choose to enter
as the high quality ﬁrm and the resultant market conﬁguration with that
kind of entry may be diﬀerent from market not covered. Therefore, to
assume uncovered market as the exogenously given market conﬁguration
in this situation would not be correct for the analysis of entry deterrence.
Moreover, if the conﬁguration of market not covered is unfeasible because
the heterogeneity in consumers tastes is not large enough, there may still
be two feasible market conﬁgurations, market covered with corner solution
and market covered with interior solution, that the incumbent would have to
consider when deciding on entry deterrence.
6 Appendix
6.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Entry is deterred when entry is not blockaded and the proﬁts of the
incumbent when entry is deterred are higher than his proﬁts when entry
is accommodated. Hence, let us prove ﬁrst Lemmas 1 and 2 that study the
cases of accommodated entry and of blockaded entry, respectively.
Lemma 1: When entry occurs we have that at the subgame perfect
equilibrium:
i) If b ≥ 8.6581, the market will not be covered and:
-s∗∗
I = Sp ∗∗
I = 2bS
4S−s∗∗









E (S − s∗∗
E )
ii) If 8.6581 ≥ b>2, the market will be covered with a corner solution
and:
-w h e n8.6581 ≥ b ≥ 5:
-sc














-w h e n5 ≥ b>2:
14-s∗
I = Sp ∗
I = 2b−1







P r o o fo fL e m m a1 : When the entrant enters the market, we can derive
ﬁrst the equilibrium outcomes for the price subgame, using the proﬁt
functions and following Wauthy (1996). The parameter regions associated
to each market conﬁguration are obtained from the decision of the consumer
with the lowest valuation for quality. The market is not covered if this
consumer does not buy any of the two products (v =1<
p1
s1), it is
covered with interior solution if he has a positive surplus when buying
t h el o wq u a l i t yp r o d u c t( 1 >
p1
s1) and it is covered with a corner solution
when his surplus from buying the low quality product is zero (the rest of
situations, where 1=
p1
s1). We use the superscripts ∗∗, c and ∗, respectively,
to denote the equilibrium values at the market conﬁgurations of market
not covered, market covered with corner solution and market covered with
interior solution. At the equilibrium of the price subgame we have:
i) Market not covered whenever b ≥
4sh−sl










h = b(sh − sl)
2sh
4sh − sl
ii) Market covered with corner solution whenever
2sh+sl














sl + b(sh − sl)
2
iii) Market covered with interior solution whenever 2 ≤ b ≤
2sh+sl
sh−sl















T h em a r k e ti sp r e e m p t e db yﬁrm h, whenever 1 <b≤ 2.17 Therefore, to
allow for the possibility of entry we focus on situations where there may be
two ﬁrms in the market and, hence, b>2.
17When b =2 , the consumer with the lowest valuation of quality is indiﬀerent between
buying any of the two goods.
15The revenue functions for each market conﬁguration can now be
written as follows (the incumbent’s proﬁt function, πI, is identical to the
corresponding revenue function, and the entrant’s proﬁt function, πE,i s
obtained subtracting F from the corresponding revenue function):











(b − 1)(4sh − sl)2 (2)




[sl + b(sh − sl)]
2





sl [(b − 2)(sh − sl) − sl]
2(b − 1)(sh − sl)
(4)










(b − 2)2(sh − sl)
9(b − 1)
(6)
Notice that the revenues of the high quality ﬁrm are higher than the
revenues of the low quality ﬁrm. Observe also that R∗
l is linear and decreasing
in sl and R∗
h is linear and increasing in sh. Moreover, it is not diﬃcult to
show the concavity of R∗∗
l and Rc
l with respect to sl. Finally, R∗∗
h is concave
with respect to sh but Rc
h is convex with respect to sh. However, we will
show that this convexity will not pose any problems for the analysis in this
work.
Let us show now that if the incumbent decides to be the high quality ﬁrm
he will choose sh = S. From Wauthy (1996) we know that the best reply to
quality sh by a ﬁrm deciding on a quality sl smaller than sh is:
∗ sl = 4





b−1 sh when the market is covered with corner solution
∗ sl = b−2
b+1sh when the market is covered with interior solution.
16As from (1), (3) and (5) we have that Rh increases with sh in each market
conﬁguration, given these best replies by the entrant, the incumbent will set
sh = S if he prefers to be the high quality ﬁrm. Although Rh given by (3) is
convex, notice that Rh increases with sh when the market is covered with a
corner solution.
M o r e o v e r ,n o t et h a tt h ep r o ﬁts of the incumbent are greater when he is
the high quality ﬁrm than when he is the low quality ﬁrm. Suppose that the
incumbent decides quality s0 and the entrant enters as the high quality ﬁrm
(with quality S, by the same argument presented above). When qualities are
s0 and S a particular market conﬁguration will result. Denoting the best low
quality reply to high quality S for this market conﬁguration by sl(sh = S),
it is, from (1) to (6):
Rl(s
0,S) ≤ Rl(sl(sh = S),S) <R h(sl(sh = S),S)
Thus, the incumbent prefers to be the high quality ﬁrm.
Hence, the quality decisions within each market conﬁguration will be:





















The parameter regions associated to each market conﬁguration have been
derived substituting the corresponding quality equilibrium decisions in the
parameter regions derived for the equilibrium outcomes of the price subgame.






7S we obtain b>8.W h e n
b<8,n o t i c et h a tR∗∗
l always increases with sl a n dt h em a r k e tw i l le n du p
covered (sl ≥ b−4
b−1S). Furthermore, when b−4
b−1S ≤ sl ≤ b−2
b+1S,w eh a v et h a tRc
l
increases with sl if b<5 and that Rc
l decreases with sl if b>10.
As there are parameter regions where more than one candidate to
equilibrium exists, we have to compare the proﬁts of the entrant under
each candidate in those regions to obtain the equilibrium selected for each
17value of b. Let us denote by NC, CC and CI, respectively, the candidates
to equilibrium corresponding to the conﬁgurations of market not covered,
market covered with a corner solution and market covered with an interior
solution.
As R∗
1 is decreasing in s1, CI is in the boundary of the region where the
m a r k e ti sc o v e r e dw i t hi n t e r i o rs o l u t i o n( i . e . ,i nt h eb o u n d a r yb e t w e e nt h a t
region and the region where the market is covered with corner solution).






E), but it diﬀers, in general, from CC.T h e r e f o r e ,
CC will always be preferred by the entrant to CI when the two solutions are





b+1). When both NCand CC are deﬁned (i.e., when 8 <b≤ 10),
it may be shown that R∗∗
E (s∗∗
E ,S) R Rc
E(sc
E,S) ⇔ b R 8.6581. Finally, it is
easy to check that the proﬁts of the entrant at NC are greater than the proﬁts
of this ﬁrm at CI w h e nt h et w os o l u t i o n sa r ed e ﬁned, i.e., when b>8. ¨
Since there are neither ﬁxed costs of increasing quality nor greater variable
costs to produce a good of higher quality, the incumbent decides sI = S
to reduce price competition. Hence, it is the entrant who determines the
equilibrium market conﬁguration. The range of values of F where, for each
value of b, there is entry accommodation may be obtained from the analyses
of blockaded entry and of deterred entry developed below.
Lemma 2 considers the case of blockaded entry. Entry is blockaded if the
incumbent behaves as a monopolist, deciding quality and price as if there was
not threat of entry, as the entrant would have negative proﬁts if he entered
into the market. The study of blockaded entry is useful for the analysis
of entry deterrence not only because we want to focus on situations where
entry cannot be blockaded, but also because the decision of the incumbent
that deters entry uses as a benchmark the monopolistic quality and price
levels corresponding to the case of blockaded entry.
Lemma 2: When entry is blockaded the incumbent decides sI = S and
pI = b
2S, and the market will not be covered. Moreover, entry is blockaded
if:18
i) b ≥ 8.6581 and F
S ≥ b2
48(b−1).
18Note that the minimum value of F that permits to block entry increases with b (the
heterogeneity of consumers tastes) and with S. Moreover, observe that this lower limit is
continuous in b (in particular, when b =8 .6581 and when b =5 ).










P r o o fo fL e m m a2 : When the incumbent selects sI = S (the quality of
monopoly), we know from Lemma 1 that the best the entrant could do is
to decide sE = 4





5 ≤ b ≤ 8.6581 (market covered with a corner solution) and sE = b−2
b+1S if
2 <b≤ 5 (a diﬀerent situation of market covered with corner solution).
Entry will be blockaded if πE(sE,S) ≤ 0. Hence, from (2), (4) and (6) we
have that entry is blockaded if:
























3(b − 1)(b +1 )
. ¨
P r o o fo fT h e o r e m1 : When the incumbent tries to deter entry he decides
sI = kS,w i t hk<1. The incumbent limits his quality, with respect to the
monopolist decision, as an entry-deterring device. In this case, the entrant
may consider to enter in the market with a quality level smaller than sI.
The quality below sI that is most proﬁtable for the entrant may be derived
from the equilibrium in Lemma 1, substituting kS for S. Alternatively,
the entrant may consider to enter the market with a quality level greater
than sI. From (1), (3) and (5) it is immediate to see that the quality
above sI most proﬁt a b l ef o rt h ee n t r a n tw o u l db eq u a l i t yS. In this case,
t h er e s u l t a n tm a r k e tc o n ﬁg u r a t i o nw o u l dd e p e n do nt h ev a l u eo f
sI
S ≡ k.
The market conﬁguration will be market covered with an interior solution
if the incumbent decides k ≥ b−2
b+1, market covered with corner solution if
b−2
b+1 ≥ k ≥ b−4
b−1 and uncovered market if b−4
b−1 ≥ k.
Let us consider the case 8.6581 ≤ b in part A of the proof, the case
5 ≤ b ≤ 8.6581 in part B and the case 2 <b≤ 5 in part C.W eu s eS c i e n t i ﬁc
WorkPlace for some calculus.
A) Case 8.6581 ≤ b
19The proﬁts of the incumbent when entry is deterred are: πdet
I = b2kS
4(b−1).
When entry is accommodated and b>8.6581, we know from the analysis
in section 3 that the proﬁts of the incumbent are: πac
I = 7b2S
48(b−1).W e h a v e
πac
I ≤ πdet
I ⇐⇒ k ≥ 7
12. If entry deterrence required k< 7
12 the incumbent
would prefer to accommodate entry. Notice that when b ≥ 8.6581 it is
b−4
b−1 > 7
12 and, hence, b−2
b+1 > 7
12.
When b ≥ 8.6581 the market would be not covered if the entrant entered
with quality smaller than sI and, therefore, the revenue functions would be
given by (1) and (2), with sh = sI and sl = sE. To deter entry the incumbent
decides sI = kS ,with k<1, and the best reply of an entrant that enters
with quality smaller than sI is sE = 4
7sI = 4
7kS. Hence, from (2) the entrant
w o u l dh a v en e g a t i v ep r o ﬁts and would not enter the market with quality




However, the entrant may also consider entry with quality (sh
E)g r e a t e r
than sI and in this case it would be, from (1), sh
E = S. Let us denote by
Rh
E (k) the revenue of the entrant, as a function of k, if he decides to enter
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4b2(1−k)S










E (k) is continuous in k (in particular, when k = b−4
b−1 and
when k = b−2
b+1). Moreover, Rh
E (0) = b2S
4(b−1), Rh




Entry will be deterred if b and F are such that:
i) b2S
48(b−1) ≥ F:e n t r yi sn o tb l o c k a d e d ,a n d
ii) there exists a k such that
→ F ≥ b2kS
48(b−1): entry with quality smaller than sI is deterred,
→ F ≥ Rh
E (k): entry with quality greater than sI is deterred.































Consider that entry is not blockaded. If there exist values of k such
that F is greater than Rh
E (k) and b2kS
48(b−1) entry will be deterred. Then the
incumbent will select sI = k∗S to deter entry, where k∗ is the maximum
value of k such that F is greater than Rh
E (k) and b2kS
48(b−1).A s Rh
E (k)
decreases with k and b2kS
48(b−1) increases with k,i tw i l la l w a y sb ek∗ such that
F = b2k∗S
48(b−1) ⇔ k∗ =
48(b−1)F
b2S (in Figure 1 it is k∗ ≡ (Rl
E)−1(F)).
L e tu ss t u d yt h ev a l u eo fk such that Rh
E (k)= b2kS
48(b−1) (i.e., let us





9(b−1) ⇔ k =
16(2b−1)2
16(2b−1)2+3b2 < 1. This is precisely what




8.6581 ≤ b and the incumbent deters entry a market covered with interior
solution would have resulted if the entrant entered with quality greater than
sI.




16(2b−1)2+3b2 ≤ k =
48(b−1)F
b2S , i.e., if F is such that
F ≥
16(2b−1)2b2S
48(b−1)[16(2b−1)2+3b2].W h e n 8.6581 ≤ b entry will be deterred for those
values of F such that:
16(2b − 1)2b2S




B) Case 5 ≤ b ≤ 8.6581
The proﬁts of the incumbent when entry is deterred are: πdet
I = b2kS
4(b−1).
When entry is accommodated and 8.6581 ≥ b ≥ 5,w ek n o wf r o mt h e





















b2 S the incumbent would prefer to accommodate entry.
When 8.6581 ≥ b ≥ 5 the market would be covered with a corner solution
if the entrant entered with quality smaller than sI and, therefore, the revenue
20This requires b<65.02, which seems realistic.
21functions would be given by (3) and (4), with sh = sI and sl = sE.T od e t e r
entry the incumbent decides sI = kS,w i t hk<1, and the best reply of
an entrant that enters with quality smaller than sI is sE =
h


















However, the entrant may also consider entry in the market with quality
(sh
E) greater than sI and in this case it would be, from (3), sh
E = S. We will
show below that the market would be covered with an interior solution if the




























































b+1 when 5 ≤ b ≤ 8.6581. Hence, when 5 ≤ b ≤ 8.6581 the function Rh
E (k)
always cuts the function Rl
E (k) at a value of k such that k>b−2
b+1.A s a
consequence the market would be covered with an interior solution if the
entrant entered with high quality. The cases of market covered with corner
solution and uncovered market when the entrant enters with quality greater
than sI are not possible. These cases would require that function Rh
E (k),
deﬁn e di np a r tA of the proof, cuts function Rl
E (k) at a value of k such that
b−4
b−1 ≤ k ≤ b−2
b+1 in the case of market covered with corner solution and at a
value of k such that k ≤ b−4
b−1 in the case of uncovered market.




























b2 , the incumbent will prefer to deter entry, when entry deterrence
is feasible, than to accommodate entry.

















b−1+1].W h e n5 ≤ b ≤ 8.6581 entry will be deterred for those




















C) Case 2 <b≤ 5
The proﬁts of the incumbent when entry is deterred are: πdet
I = b2kS
4(b−1).
When entry is accommodated and 5 ≥ b>2 we know from the analysis in
section 3 that the proﬁts of the incumbent are: πac
I =
(2b−1)2S
3(b−1)(b+1).W e h a v e
πac
I ≤ πdet
I ⇐⇒ k ≥
4(2b−1)2
3(b+1)b2. If entry deterrence required k<
4(2b−1)2
3(b+1)b2S the
incumbent would prefer to accommodate entry.
When 5 ≥ b>2 the market would be covered with interior solution if
the entrant entered with quality smaller than sI and, therefore, the revenue
functions would be given by (5) and (6), with sh = sI and sl = sE.T od e t e r
entry the incumbent decides sI = kS ,w i t hk<1, and the best reply of
an entrant that enters with quality smaller than sI is sE = b−2
b+1kS (thus, in






3(b − 1)(b +1 )
and FB ≡
(b − 2)2S
3(b − 1)(b +1 )
However, the entrant may also consider entry with quality (sh
E)g r e a t e r
than sI and in this case it would be, from (5), sh
E = S. As we have seen that
entry deterrence by the incumbent requires k>b−2
b+1 when 2 <b≤ 5,i ft h e
entrant entered with (high) quality S it would be
sI
S = k>b−2
b+1,t h em a r k e t





2 (1 − k)S
9(b − 1)
Notice also that b ∈ (2,5] implies
4(2b−1)2
3(b+1)b2 > b−2
b+1. Hence, when the incumbent
deters entry he selects k such that the market would be covered with an








∂k > 0.I f k =0= ⇒
(b−2)2



















P r o c e e d i n ga si np a r tA )w eo b t a i n( s e eF i g u r e1 )t h a t(Rl
E)−1(F)=
3(b−1)(b+1)F
(b−2)2S and k1 =
(2b−1)2(b+1)










(2b−1)2(b+1)+3(b−2)2, and the incumbent
will prefer to deter entry, when entry deterrence is feasible, than to
accommodate entry.
Hence, entry deterrence is feasible for a given F when this F satisﬁes
(2b−1)2(b+1)
(2b−1)2(b+1)+3(b−2)2 ≤ k =
3(b−1)(b+1)F
(b−2)2S , i.e., if F is such that F ≥
(2b−1)2(b−2)2S
3(b−1)[(2b−1)2(b+1)+3(b−2)2].W h e n 2 <b≤ 5 entry will be deterred for those
values of F such that
(2b − 1)




2 (b +1 )+3 ( b − 2)2¤ ≤ F ≤
(b − 2)2S
3(b − 1)(b +1 )
. ¥
6.2 Reaction functions with ﬁxed quality costs
The proﬁt functions of the ﬁr m si ne a c hm a r k e tc o n ﬁguration may be
obtained substracting ﬁxed quality costs, and the entry cost in the case of
the entrant, from the revenue functions presented in the proof of Theorem 1.
Let us represent the ﬁxed quality cost function by c(s),w i t hc0(s) > 0 and
c00(s) > 0. The reaction functions corresponding to the quality decisions of
ﬁrms are:














h − 3slsh +2 s2
l)
(b − 1)(4sh − sl)3 − c
0(sh)=0 (8)





















4(b − 1)(sh − sl)2 − c
0(sh)=0 (10)

















The equilibrium for each market conﬁguration derives from the
corresponding conditions in (7) to (12) (notice that second order conditions
are satisﬁed). Under convex ﬁxed quality costs, the proﬁt function of the
low quality ﬁrm when the market is not covered and the proﬁtf u n c t i o no f
the low quality ﬁrm when the market is covered with a corner solution are
concave with respect to sl.M o r e o v e r ,πl decreases with sl when the market
is covered with an interior solution. Hence, condition (11) implies that sl will
equal the minimum value that permits to attain this market conﬁguration.
The proﬁt function of the high quality ﬁr mw h e nt h em a r k e ti sn o tc o v e r e d
and the proﬁt function of the high quality ﬁr mw h e nt h em a r k e ti sc o v e r e d
with an interior solution are concave with respect to sh. The feasibility
of the conﬁguration of market covered with corner solution requires that
the convexity of the cost function compensates the convexity of the revenue
function of the high quality ﬁrm to obtain a concave proﬁtf u n c t i o no ft h e
high quality ﬁrm within that conﬁguration. If the proﬁt function of the high
quality ﬁrm is convex in the conﬁguration of market covered with corner
solution, it will never result this conﬁguration at equilibrium.
If there are convex ﬁxed quality costs, the values of b where each market
conﬁguration is feasible if the entrant entered as the low quality ﬁrm, and the
values of b where each market conﬁguration is obtained in that case, depend
on the function c(s). Moreover, even for simple ﬁxed quality cost functions,
and considering situations where sI = S, it is not possible to obtain neither
s∗∗
E nor sc
E in an explicit way.
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